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ABSTRACT
Modern technology—biotechnology in par-
ticular—confronts the Christian community 
with a plethora of complex issues and questions 
for which there are no simple answers.  Some of 
those issues—stem cell research, for example—are 
relatively speciﬁ c and immediate.  Others are more 
hypothetical: genetic therapy for lengthening life-
span is one example.  One particular issue that is 
both theoretical and immediate is the question of 
stewardship.  What does the Lord require of his 
image-bearing creatures with respect to their rela-
tionship to the rest of creation?  Some Christians 
have argued that we are called by God to respect 
and conserve the created order and that we do so 
by seeking ecological understanding and promot-
ing actions that minimize human disruption of 
and/or intervention  in  those ecological patterns 
that we discover.  Other Christians, hearing God’s 
call to “be fruitful and increase in number, ﬁ ll the 
earth and subdue it,” understand stewardship more 
in terms of development.  The former group raise 
many concerns with respect to biotechnology.  The 
latter group are eager to promote biotechnological 
advancement.  Far too often, however, representa-
tives of both groups are inﬂ uenced by naturalism as 
much as by careful biblical thinking.
Using a relatively novel interdisciplinary ap-
proach, this paper will advocate for the embrace of 
epistemological humility as a way of avoiding the 
pitfalls of naturalistic thinking and for remaining 
faithful to traditional Christian understandings of 
the nature of creation and of what it means to be 
human.  Starting with basic biblical tenets that have 
been accepted by Christians for centuries, it will seek 
to articulate a relationship between the human and 
non-human creation that encourages careful bio-
technological advance within the context of creation 
care, and that transcends the polarization between 
unbridled development and stagnating conservation. 
The approach will incorporate insights from the his-
tory of science (e.g., Galileo, Descartes) and the phi-
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losophy of technology (e.g., Egbert Schuurman) with 
basic Christian doctrine (e.g., the Apostle’s Creed) to 
imply a posture of epistemological humility suitable 
as a common foundation from which to approach 
speciﬁ c issues and problems in biotechnology.
INTRODUCTION
Because of this the land mourns, and all who live 
in it waste away; the beasts of the ﬁ eld and the 
birds of the air and the ﬁ sh of the sea are dying. 
(Hosea 4:3, NIV )
You will go out in joy and be led forth in peace; 
the mountains and hills will burst into song before 
you, and all the trees of the ﬁ eld will clap their 
hands. (Isaiah 55:10-12, NIV )
The words of Hosea and Isaiah bring critical un-
derstanding to what we read in the Psalms (e.g., Psalm 
8, 19, 24) and in the book of Genesis (Genesis 1 and 
2): the earth, all of creation, belongs to God.  He 
loves it and cares for it; but his image-bearing crea-
ture has sinned and brought shame and brokenness 
upon that creation.  Nonetheless, by God’s grace the 
whole of creation will be redeemed.  Humankind 
and mountains, the beasts and the trees of the ﬁ eld 
alike, will share in the eternal reconciliation bought 
by the suffering of the Redeemer, the one revealed 
in the New Testament as Jesus, the Word of God in 
human form, the Creator-Sustainer-Redeemer of all 
things (Colossians 1:15-20).
In these last days, before the return of Jesus, 
we humans experience both the brokenness de-
scribed by Hosea and the shalom foreseen by Isaiah. 
Moreover, we are called to serve as God’s hands in 
his world: the instruments through which he brings 
healing and reconciliation to his creation.  At the 
beginning of the twenty-ﬁ rst century, we ﬁ nd our-
selves having learned how to transform creation in 
ways unimagined by the Old Testament prophets. 
In particular, the most recent advances in biotech-
nology have enabled humankind to wield unimag-
ined power, power that can bring both great heal-
ing and great devastation upon creation, including 
humankind itself.
Getting in Bed with Frankenstein
Agriculture deﬁ nes northwest Iowa. Sioux 
Center, located on the plains of northwest Iowa, is 
surrounded by ﬁ elds of corn and soybeans, punc-
tuated by hog and cattle feedlots.  However, agri-
culture is changing.  The corn has been genetically 
modiﬁ ed to resist herbicides, and the  reproduction 
of cattle is gaining assistance from artiﬁ cial in-
semination and cloning.  Even so, a newcomer has 
been added to the northwest Iowa landscape: the 
biotechnology company.  By 2002, there were no 
less than seven biotechnology companies operating 
in northwest Iowa, and increasingly, Dordt College 
graduates—with majors in chemistry, biology, and 
agriculture—were ﬁ lling their professional ranks.  
With this newcomer, it seemed natural and ap-
propriate to some at Dordt College that a program 
in biotechnology be established. What was envi-
sioned was not a full-blown research and teaching 
program that would compete with the likes of Iowa 
State University but rather a modest undergraduate 
program, one that would more completely prepare 
students for service in the ﬁ eld of biotechnology, 
both in terms of technical competence and—more 
importantly—Christian perspective.
However, what seemed natural and appropriate 
to some, struck horror in the minds of others. Dordt 
College has had a program in environmental stud-
ies for a decade or more, originating in its Biology 
Department and eventually becoming a major in 
its own right.  The quarter-century-old Agriculture 
Program has always held a reputation for promot-
ing sustainability and creation care.  As a result, a 
number of Dordt life scientists (agronomists, biolo-
gists, environmental scientists, etc.) raised serious 
questions about the appropriateness of starting a 
biotechnology program.  To them, it was inconsis-
tent for an institution devoted to “serviceable in-
sight,” “care for creation,” and “obedient steward-
ship” to promote a ﬁ eld of inquiry/endeavor that 
they perceived to be hubris-motivated, unstewardly, 
dangerous in the extreme, “playing God” (whatever 
that might mean), and contemptuous of creation. 
Joining the life scientists were a number of philoso-
phers who believed that before any such program 
is started, those starting it must demonstrate its 
expertise with respect to such philosophy-of- bio-
technology issues as safety and risk, bioethics, and 
transgenic manipulation.
Under that directive, a “biotechnology working 
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group” was formed to investigate the outstanding 
issues and to propose a program that would assuage 
the critics and give form to the vision of those who 
believed that Dordt had a high calling to start a bio-
technology program.  Before the formal proposal to 
start the program was adopted in May of 2006, the 
group had produced a ﬁ fty-four page position paper 
titled Getting in Bed with Frankenstein: Why a Christian 
College Should Develop Programs in Biotechnolog y,1 pro-
viding a biblically based rationale for the program 
and addressing some of the most contentious is-
sues.  Throughout the process, however, it became 
clear that the central issue of debate was the tension 
between a view of stewardship as conserving, car-
ing for, and serving the non-human creation, and a 
view of stewardship as unfolding, developing, and 
serving the non-human creation. 
Stewardship as Conserving or Stewardship as 
Development: An “Either/Or”?
The position paper prepared by the Biotech-
nology Working Group laid the groundwork for 
and brieﬂ y addressed such issues as sustainable 
agriculture, safety and risk, distributive justice, ge-
netically modiﬁ ed crops and the developing world, 
transgenic manipulation and the boundaries of 
“kinds,” the sanctity of life and of human life, clon-
ing, and the nature of human nature.  Ultimately, 
it was found that each of these issues, as well as 
the question of development versus conservation, 
is grounded in just a few more fundamental issues. 
Those turn out to be (1) the deﬁ nition of biotech-
nology, (2) humanity’s fall into sin and the scope 
of the consequent curse, and (3) the relation of hu-
manity to the non-human creation.
DEFINING BIOTECHNOLOGY 
The ﬁ rst question is whether a narrow or broad 
deﬁ nition of biotechnology is appropriate.  To some, 
the word “biotechnology” is synonymous with “ge-
netic engineering” and is irrevocably tied to trans-
genic manipulation and cloning.  Such a deﬁ nition 
is unhelpful for a number of reasons.  First, it begs 
the question by deﬁ ning a human activity in terms 
of particular forms of that activity—forms that are 
at the heart of the controversy.  Second, and more 
important, it fails to allow for a careful analysis of 
the context of meaning of the activity we call bio-
technology.  Thereby it opens itself up to assump-
tions it may well want to reject.
The Working Group found that a more gen-
eral deﬁ nition of biotechnology allowed for a care-
ful analysis of the various issues.  In Stephen V. 
Monsma’s book Responsible Technolog y, a comprehen-
sive deﬁ nition of technology is offered and carefully 
explained. That deﬁ nition views technology as one 
kind of human response to the “creation mandate,” 
the call given to humankind, in Genesis 1:28 and 
2:15, to “be fruitful and increase in number; ﬁ ll the 
earth and subdue it….Rule over the ﬁ sh of the sea 
and the birds of the air and over every living crea-
ture that moves on the ground.”  According to the 
deﬁ nition given in Responsible Technolog y, technol-
ogy involves as its subject “the natural creation.”2
The authors understand this term to mean physi-
cal and living things.  Thus, it is reasonable to see 
“technology” as being capable of subdivision into 
two categories: the technology of physical subjects 
and the technology of living subjects.  This was 
the approach taken by the Dordt Working Group: 
Biotechnology, most simply, is the technology of 
living subjects.  Reﬁ ning the general deﬁ nition of 
technology given in Responsible Technolog y, the fol-
Throughout the process, 
however, it became clear 
that the central issue of 
debate was the tension 
between a view of 
stewardship as conserving, 
caring for, and serving the 
non-human creation, and 
a view of stewardship as 
unfolding, developing, and 
serving the non-human 
creation. 
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lowing was agreed upon:
  Biotechnology is a distinct, cultural activity 
in which human beings exercise freedom and are 
held accountable as they respond to God by trans-
forming the biotic creation, with the aid of tools 
and procedures, for basic research and for practi-
cal ends and purposes.
THE FALL AND THE CURSE
 While no one at Dordt denied the radical fall 
into sin and the brokenness that has been its result, 
the extent of that brokenness became an issue.  If, 
for example, the non-human creation is unaffected 
by the fall except in terms of its direct (causal) rela-
tionships with humankind, then the order and re-
lationships we ﬁ nd within the non-human creation 
might (and I stress the word “might”) be given a 
kind of benchmark status in our biotechnological 
work.  If, on the other hand, the curse is more sys-
temic and creation does indeed “groan” of its own 
accord—even without causal interaction with sinful 
humanity—then the order and relationships we ob-
serve in the non-human creation cannot with con-
ﬁ dence be used as a template for biotechnological 
work.  However, this issue is beyond the scope of 
this paper and, to at least some extent, overlaps the 
third issue: the relationship of humanity to the non-
human creation.  
HUMANKIND’S RELATION TO
THE NON-HUMAN CREATION
What is the relationship of humankind to the 
non-human creation?  Are humans simply one 
more species of living things that, at this point in 
the history of the universe, is effectuating signiﬁ -
cant change on planet Earth but that will one day go 
the way of the dinosaur?  Or are humans a unique 
species unlike any other kind of living creature, a 
species that has the capacity to radically alter its 
own environment and possibly its own nature in 
unpredictable directions?  Are humans a develop-
ing form of divinity?  Or are humans the servants of 
a deity that created the universe and made humans 
his representative to serve, care for, and enable that 
universe to ﬂ ourish?  And particularly in these days 
of advancing technological capability, how does our 
understanding of the relationship of humans to the 
non-human creation inform our understanding of 
technology?
Thomas Hobbes’ famous description of the 
“natural condition of mankind” as “solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish, and short” 3 only slightly exaggerates 
the experience of most people in pre-modern times. 
The phrase “over-against” conveys concisely the re-
lationship of humans to the non-human creation. 
Finding or producing sufﬁ cient food and protection 
against the weather and predators dominated that 
relationship.  
Civilization enabled humankind to reﬂ ect on 
that “over-against” relationship.  However, while 
one might ﬁ nd some appreciation for the non-hu-
man creation in the writings of Homer and of the 
Old Testament,4 it was Hellenistic thought that 
most deﬁ nitely shaped attitudes regarding the re-
lation of humankind and non-humankind.  At the 
center of that thought was Platonic idealism, with its 
own particular form of “over-against.”   The non-
human creation was viewed as imperfect and tem-
poral matter, lacking substance and permanence, 
a mere shadow (to use Plato’s analogy) of the ideal 
and eternal forms that could only be approached by 
thought.  The truly human part of humankind was 
that thinking apparatus or mind.  The human body 
was separate from that mind, merely part of the in-
substantial and impermanent non-human creation.
As an unhappy result, much of Christian thought 
has been inﬂ uenced by Hellenistic idealism.  Where 
the New Testament spoke of “spirit” or “soul,” the 
Church understood the immaterial, rational, and 
eternal essence of humankind.  Where the New 
Testament spoke of “body,” the Church understood 
corrupt, sinful, and impermanent matter.  The es-
cape of the Christian’s soul from the body and into 
“heaven” paralleled the escape of the Hellenistic 
“rational soul” from the prison of the body into the 
world of forms.  Clearly the relationship of human-
kind to the non-human creation remained one of 
“over against” in much of Christian thought.
It was a synthesis of Greek and Christian thought 
that dominated Western culture from the early 
Middle Ages to the time of the Renaissance and the 
Enlightenment: biblical theology and Aristotelian 
cosmology inﬂ uenced each other and provided the 
foundation for the Western medieval worldview. 
On that foundation the Copernican Revolution in 
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science arose, as did the Protestant Reformation. 
These and other Renaissance and Enlightenment 
developments altered the way humankind viewed 
the non-human creation.  The rise of empiricism in 
science indicates a very different way of looking at 
the world around us, one that, one might say, gives 
it more respect than was given during the Middle 
Ages, when an understanding of the universe was 
based on what might be derived, in strictly ratio-
nal manner, from incidental experience and age-old 
cosmological beliefs.  However, even if the non-hu-
man creation was respected as a source of valuable 
data, it was still viewed as “over-against” human 
thought and understanding.  The dualism of soul 
and body remained pervasive.
Consequently, the age of exploration and the 
Industrial Revolution built upon an altered founda-
tion: one still grounded in the synthesis of Greek 
thought and Christian theology but now with 
the beneﬁ t of pilings driven by the Copernican 
Revolution in science.  The sciences of mechanics 
and thermodynamics made possible the develop-
ment of new machines and structures, such as the 
steam engine and the railroad. However, that devel-
opment came only after considerable human effort. 
The non-human creation continued to resist hu-
mankind’s attempt to know her and to bring forth 
her artifactual children.  Thus, both the science 
and the technology of the period we know as the 
Industrial Revolution reinforced the “over-against” 
view of the relationship between the human and the 
non-human creation.
The seeds of change in this view were planted 
by Darwin, but they did not begin to sprout until 
the late twentieth century.  The idea that human-
kind was nothing but another expression of the 
immutable and inviolable laws of nature—or even 
more speciﬁ cally, the laws of mechanics—was ex-
pressed by a few, most notably the French mathe-
matician and astronomer Pierre Laplace.  However, 
mechanical reductionism remained too much a vio-
lation of common sense to gain signiﬁ cant popular-
ity.  Darwin’s work replaced mechanical reduction-
ism with biotic reductionism, a view that appealed 
a bit more to common sense.  After all, there are 
more commonalities between humans and chim-
panzees than there are between humans and stars 
or between humans and water molecules.  The late 
nineteenth century and most of the twentieth cen-
tury, therefore, witnessed a change in attitude re-
garding the relationship of the human to the non-
human creation.  Increasingly, humans were seen 
as a uniquely evolved part of the natural creation. 
Then the 1960s occurred, and the notion of humans 
as simply a natural part of the natural creation was 
dealt an enigmatic blow.  It became clear to more 
than just professional ecologists that humans were 
causing all sorts of problems in the non-human 
environment.  The science of ecology arose from 
obscurity to address one of the chief issues of the 
day: the environmental crisis.  As a result of all these 
thought-changes, understanding of the relationship 
between the human and the non-human creation 
was obscured, with the “over-against” view gain-
ing new strength from the palpably obvious tension 
between strivings for human development and the 
concern for a “clean,” or even “pristine,” environ-
ment.
THE NON-ANSWER OF NATURALISM
In some respects, naturalism may be seen as re-
sulting from the melding of Greek and Christian 
thought.  Naturalism is the view, or system of 
It was a synthesis of Greek 
and Christian thought 
that dominated Western 
culture from the early 
Middle Ages to the time of 
the Renaissance and the 
Enlightenment: biblical 
theology and Aristotelian 
cosmology influenced each 
other and provided the 
foundation for the Western 
medieval worldview.  
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of human nature.”5 Ray Kurzweil 6 and Rodney 
Brooks,7 on the other hand, emphasize the “na-
ture pole,” explaining everything in terms of the 
laws of physical causality, and thus predict the day 
when there will be no difference between humans 
and what we today call robots.  Kurzweil, in fact, 
predicts human immortality being achieved by 
downloading our minds into the computer storage 
devices that will be an integral part of our new and 
replaceable robotic “bodies.”8
A more sophisticated form of naturalism, and 
one that historically has attracted a number of 
Christian thinkers, is the approach of “natural law.” 
John Locke, Hugo Grotius, and Thomas Aquinas 
are names associated with the natural law tradition 
in history.  Recent work by Wesley Wildman and 
by Rolf Bouma, a doctoral student of Wildman’s, 
uses the approach of natural law to develop norms 
for biotechnological activity. 9  While Wildman and 
Bouma’s approach gives some useful guidelines by 
pointing to the perceived structure of creation and 
rightfully insisting that we respect that structure, it 
tends to identify normativity with structure and ei-
ther restricts itself to biotic and physical structures 
or seeks to reduce other evidences of structure (e.g., 




One can gain much insight into the conserva-
tion-development debate, as well as into the natural-
istic perspective, by studying the history of science. 
To a physical scientist, there are two key episodes 
in the history of Western science that stand out as 
“revolutionary:” the Copernican Revolution in the 
sixteenth century and the Einsteinian Revolution in 
the early twentieth century.  
Prior to the Copernican Revolution—that is, pri-
or to the discoveries represented by Copernicus and 
Kepler in Astronomy and Galileo and Newton in 
mechanics—Western science was dominated by the 
well-established theories of Aristotle.  Astronomy 
was geocentric; mechanics was understood in terms 
of the doctrine of “natural place,” and what was to 
become chemistry was guided by the four-element 
theory of matter.  These were the established under-
standings of the physical creation, basic components 
thought, holding that all phenomena (things and 
events) can be explained in terms of “natural” 
causes and laws, where “natural” is understood as 
that which is exclusively biotic and physical.  In 
many circles, the melding of Greek and Christian 
thought led to a kind of deism, wherein the Creator 
is understood to have brought into being all things 
and the laws by which all things function, and then 
simply to have allowed them to function in a seem-
ingly autonomous fashion, with that lawfulness in-
herent in the things themselves.  The Darwinian 
variety of naturalism asserts that those laws are 
fundamentally biotic and physical.  The Laplacian 
variety asserts that they are only physical, biotic laws 
being reducible to physical law.
Of course, one need not be a deist to embrace 
naturalism; an atheist can embrace naturalism just 
as well. A theist can also adopt a posture of method-
ological naturalism; that is, one can do scientiﬁ c and 
technological work “as if” all things and events can 
be explained in terms of natural causes and laws.
A problem with naturalism, however, is incoher-
ence.  Naturalism must begin with a belief in the 
capacity of free human thought to understand and 
shape the world around itself.  However, when the 
naturalism gets to the point of explaining all things 
and events in terms of physical causality, it effec-
tively eliminates the possibility for truly free human 
thought.  Thought itself becomes explainable—one 
might even say determined—by the laws of physics. 
The only escape for the naturalist is to posit a radi-
cally dualistic ontology: one where the world of na-
ture and the world of free human thought are completely 
separate from each other. That escape is illusory, 
however, because the basic problem of how humans 
are to interact with the non-human creation betrays 
the inseparability of nature and free human thought.  
Nonetheless, a form of naturalism can be at-
tractive to a Christian mind that sees the world in 
dualistic terms: spirit and matter.  It fails, however, 
to address the tension between conservation and 
development.  A naturalist position can be used, 
and has been used, to defend either side of the argu-
ment.  Francis Fukuyama, for example, emphasizes 
the pole of “free human thought” in his book Our 
Posthuman Future; here he raises deep concern about 
the ways  humans are altering the natural environ-
ment. He shows particular concern for the “nature 
Pro Rege—March 2007     7 
in the Western worldview for close to two-thousand 
years.  However, in a relatively short time during the 
Sixteenth Century, that would all change.  Today we 
tend to look back on the theories of Aristotle as in-
tuitive but primitive or quaint, and we neglect to 
appreciate how long those theories stood the test of 
time.
By the end of the nineteenth century, it seemed 
that the Newtonian worldview had matured.  The 
revolution had been accomplished, and what was 
left was to collect the data and tidy up the details. 
The Industrial Revolution and developments in the 
thermal-ﬂ uid sciences—all based on Newtonian 
physics—seemed to conﬁ rm that we had arrived at 
a place of scientiﬁ c understanding of the universe. 
However, over the course of less than twenty years, 
at the beginning of the Twentieth Century the work 
of Planck, Einstein, Bohr, and Heisenberg turned 
Newtonian mechanics on its head.  Today we appre-
ciate Newtonian science as an adequate model and 
empirical explanation of the phenomena, so long as 
one does not do anything extreme or look at any-
thing too closely.  Still, it is a model that fails to truly 
explain the lawfulness in the physical creation.
What, then, is the cosmological model that dom-
inates science today?  What view of the world has 
privileged—or as Thomas Kuhn describes it, “par-
adigmatic”—status?  Surely it is one that is a revo-
lutionary reﬁ nement of the Newtonian worldview, 
with relativity and quantum mechanics providing 
that reﬁ nement.  However, the revolutionary work 
of Planck, Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli, Schrödinger, 
De Broglie, Born, and others—and especially the 
arguments between Bohr and Einstein—have made 
it clear that the cosmological picture that we have 
today is as much an epistemological picture as it is 
an ontological one.  Whereas the Newtonian world-
view was a naïve realist worldview, the post-mod-
ern cosmological picture, inﬂ uenced by positivism 
and linguistic analysis, exists as a tension between 
realism and idealism.  We are much more ready 
today, than we were in Galileo or Newton’s day, 
to admit that our cosmological world picture is as 
much a product of our epistemological apparatus as 
it is a picture of what is “really and truly out there.” 
Einstein resisted that admission, wanting to believe 
in a much closer relationship among the knower, 
knowing, and the known subject.  Neils Bohr, who 
was, interestingly, known as a very humble per-
son, embraced the uncertainty and ambiguity that 
seemed required by the epistemology of quantum 
mechanics.  His theory of complimentarity, as well 
as Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, arises from a 
kind of epistemological humility.
Galileo’s Epistemology
But epistemological humility has not been 
a dominant characteristic of Western scientiﬁ c 
thought.  Consider Galileo, for example.  While 
popular understanding limits his conﬂ ict with the 
Church in Rome to have been primarily with the 
relative position of the earth and the sun—geocen-
tric versus heliocentric astronomical models—it 
can be argued that the conﬂ ict was actually much 
deeper, more on the level of biblical hermeneutics 
and epistemology.  Galileo’s views regarding Holy 
Scripture and the relationship of theology to natural 
science are formulated most carefully in his “Letter 
to the Grand Duchess Christina.” 11 Therein one 
will ﬁ nd his use of the phrase, “the intention of the 
Holy Ghost is to teach us how one goes to heaven, 
not how heaven goes.”12  Galileo’s epistemological 
opinions, however, are nowhere more apparent than 
in his Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, 
the book that caused him the greatest amount of 
trouble with the Church.  Consider the following 
paragraph on the absolute nature of those particu-
lar modes of human understanding associated with 
We are much more ready 
today, than we were 
in Galileo or Newton’s 
day, to admit that our 
cosmological world picture 
is as much a product of our 
epistemological apparatus 
as it is a picture of what is 
“really and truly out there.”
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mathematics and natural science:
  Human understanding can be taken in two 
modes, the intensive or the extensive.  Extensively, 
that is, with regard to the multitude of intelligibles, 
which are inﬁ nite, the human understanding is as 
nothing even if it understands a thousand proposi-
tions; for a thousand in relation to inﬁ nity is zero.  
But taking man’s understanding intensively, in 
so far as this term denotes understanding some 
proposition perfectly, I say that the human intel-
lect does understand some of them perfectly and 
thus in these it has as much absolute certainty as 
Nature itself has. Of such are the mathematical 
sciences alone; that is, geometry and arithmetic, in 
which the Divine intellect indeed knows inﬁ nitely 
more propositions, since it knows all.  But with re-
gard to those few which the human intellect does 
understand, I be lieve that its knowledge equals the 
Divine in objective certainty, for here it succeeds 
in understanding necessity, beyond which there 
can be no greater sureness.13
This speech is placed in the mouth of Salviati, 
Galileo’s representative in the Dialogue.  As if antici-
pating the coming fury, Galileo has Simplicio, a par-
ticipant in the Dialogue, suggest that Salviati’s speech 
strikes him “as very bold and daring.”  Salviati re-
plies that such is not the case, that his discussion 
of absolute certainty is no more bold than saying 
“God cannot undo what is done,” a proposition that 
had some general acceptance at that time.14 Then, 
to clarify his argu ment, Galileo has Salviati say the 
following:
  So in order to explain myself better, I say that 
as to the truth of the knowledge which is given by 
mathematical proofs, this is the same that Divine 
wisdom recognizes; but I shall concede to you in-
deed that the way in which God knows the inﬁ nite 
propositions of which we know some few is ex-
ceedingly more excellent than ours.  Our method 
proceeds with reasoning by steps from one con-
clusion to another, while His is one of simple intui-
tion.15
Galileo’s caveat notwithstanding, he is asserting 
that human knowledge can be absolutely certain—
just as it is for God—and that certain kinds of hu-
man knowledge, e.g., 2 + 2 = 4, are the same for the 
human creature as they are for the Creator.  Galileo 
is recognized today as a revolutionary experimental 
physicist but not even as a second-rate philosopher. 
Nonetheless, his cosmology arises from a philo-
sophical worldview that would dominate Western 
thought and, it may be argued, remains with us to-
day in reﬁ ned but essentially unaltered form.
Descartes’ Epistemological Dualism
Quoting him as writing, “I wished to give my-
self entirely to the search after truth,” Frederick 
Copleston describes Descartes’ fundamental aim 
as the attainment of philosophical truth by the use 
of reason.16 Likewise, Peter Schouls asserts that for 
“Descartes, the greatest need which the philoso-
pher can ﬁ ll is to do away with insecurity, with lack 
of certainty.”17
It may be argued that whereas Galileo did battle 
with the scholasticism of the late medieval Church, 
Descartes did battle with skepticism. 18  Descartes’ 
famous method of doubt has one chief end, the at-
tainment of certain knowledge.  He believes that 
there is only one kind of knowledge and that it is 
certain and evident.  Unique to Descartes is the 
notion that there is only one kind of science based 
on that one kind of knowledge and that there can 
be only one scientiﬁ c method. 19  This one kind of 
knowledge is attained by the “light of rea son,” and it 
stands over against uncertainty, falsehood, and prae-
judicia: Descartes’ technical term for those opinions 
and hypothetical statements that have yet to with-
stand methodological doubt.
Thus for Descartes, knowledge is certain and 
is grounded in reason.  The nature of reason is ex-
pressed by intuition and deduction.  Quoting from 
Descartes’ Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Schouls 
writes,
To say that the understanding can acquire knowl-
edge in a way other than through intuition and de-
duction would be false, for “nothing can be added 
to the pure light of reason which does not in some 
way obscure it.”  Thus it is these “two operations 
of our understanding, intuition and deduction, on 
which alone...we must rely in the acquisition of our 
knowl edge.”  Intuition and deduction express the 
very nature of reason.20   
Descartes’ epistemological dualism (e.g., certain 
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knowledge vs. praejudicia) is consistent with his on-
tological dualism (res cogitans vs. res extensa).  His “one 
kind of science” based on his “one kind of knowl-
edge” meant for him that all the natural sciences 
could be reduced to physics and that thus the whole 
material world could be treated as a mechanical sys-
tem.  This is manifest, for example, in his interpre-
tation of ani mals as machines and in his rejection 
of the need to consider any but efﬁ cient causes in 
physics.  In other words, ﬁ nal causality is a theo-
logical concern and has no place in physics.21 Thus, 
Descartes’ ontological dualism reinforces his epis-
temological dualism.  Further, although Descartes 
may not have done so himself, those who followed 
him would begin to classify theological knowledge 
in one category, with respect to certainty, and scien-
tiﬁ c knowledge in another category.  
In summary, there is an interesting relationship 
between Galileo and Newton, on the one hand, and 
between Galileo and Descartes, on the other: where 
Newton polished and codiﬁ ed Galileo’s mechanics, 
one might say that Descartes polished and codiﬁ ed 
his epistemology.
Learning from History
What, then, might we learn from this brief ex-
ploration of the history of science?  It may well be 
helpful to remind ourselves of the following: (1) the 
modern scientiﬁ c worldview has been around for 
less than ﬁ ve hundred years, in comparison to the 
two-thousand-year reign of the Aristotelian world-
view, and it has experienced signiﬁ cant change in 
the last hundred years; (2) the absolutization of hu-
man knowledge and its equation—at least in some 
forms—with divine knowledge by Galileo and the 
codiﬁ cation of that epistemological absolutism by 
Descartes, ought to raise some questions about the 
epistemological assumptions we make today.
A BIBLICAL-THEISTIC
STARTING POINT22
In the beginning God created the heavens and the 
earth. (Genesis 1:1, NIV)
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was 
with God, and the Word was God.  He was with 
God in the beginning.  Through him all things 
were made; without him nothing was made that 
has been made. (John 1:1-3, NIV)
While these verses provide a good place to start 
discussing a Christian view of the conservation-de-
velopment debate, the doctrine that God created all 
things is afﬁ rmed and stressed throughout Scripture. 
Given that stress, one may state the central idea in 
a slightly different form as “the radical distinction 
between Creator and creation,” or, expressed nega-
tively, “Nothing God made is God.” 23  Outside of 
Scripture, the doctrine is confessed by Christian 
churches everywhere when they recite the Apostle’s 
Creed: “I believe in God the Father almighty, maker 
of heaven and earth.”  On the basis of this doctrine 
one may deduce the non-self-sufﬁ ciency and the 
referential character of creation. 
Th e Non-self-suﬃ  ciency and
Referential Character of Creation24
Creation, or “nature,” or however else we may 
refer to “the known universe and all that it con-
tains,” is not self-sufﬁ cient.  It was created by God 
and is sustained by him.  Its existence is wholly de-
pendent on its Creator.  Moreover, having no exis-
tence “in itself,” its only meaning and purpose can 
be, directly or indirectly, to serve its Creator.  Thus, 
everything in creation refers back to its Creator, ei-
ther in accordance with his will or in some distort-
ed and disobedient manner.  Only God is eternal, 
without beginning, and wholly self-sufﬁ cient.
The sin of idolatry occurs whenever humankind 
Thus, everything in creation 
refers back to its Creator, 
either in accordance with 
his will or in some distorted 
and disobedient manner.  
Only God is eternal, 
without beginning, and 
wholly self-sufficient.
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views creation, or some part thereof, as it ought to 
view God.  In modern expressions of naturalism, for 
example, the material world, reduced to atomic and 
sub-atomic particles, is considered to be “all that is.” 
Matter and energy are believed to be eternal (the 
First Law of Thermodynamics as taught to junior 
high school students: “matter and energy are neither 
created nor destroyed but only changed from one 
form to another”).  Another example of idolatry 
occurs when humankind deiﬁ es some part of cre-
ation, claiming it to be “sacred” or “holy,” relative 
to the rest of creation.  This deifying of creation is 
the idolatry of ancient pagan or animist cultures. It 
can also be the idolatry of modern cultures that cir-
cumscribe certain parts of creation, claiming them 
to be “off limits” to human interaction, including 
inquiry.  
Th e Goodness, Diversity,
and Unity of Creation
God created all things “good.”  Whether we 
read the creation account in Genesis, the divine po-
etry of the Psalms, Proverbs and Job, or the words 
of the prophets, we are confronted with the unmis-
takable message that God loves and delights in his 
whole creation: lions and dandelions, the birds of 
the air and the ﬁ sh of the sea, humans created in 
his image, mountains, and stars.  His expressed love 
for and delight in the creation entail the command 
that his image-bearing creatures, humankind, are to 
love, care for, and delight in that creation as well.
The creation is diverse.  There are innumerable 
individual creatures that have existed, presently ex-
ist, and will exist before Christ returns.  Moreover, 
there are mind-boggling numbers of “kinds” of 
creatures.  The command given to Adam to name 
the living creatures25 suggests both the ordered 
diversity within creation and humankind’s task in 
recognizing, respecting, and bringing to verbal ex-
pression that diversity.
Notwithstanding this great diversity, there exists 
a fundamental unity to creation.  All creatures owe 
their origin, their continued sustenance, and their 
ﬁ nal redemption to the Word of God. 26  All share a 
common non-self-sufﬁ ciency and ﬁ nitude.
The goodness of creation means that evil is al-
ways a distortion of what is good, never a creature27
(or substance) in itself.  The diversity of creation 
stands over against attempts to reduce creation to 
one or two substances, e.g., the matter and energy 
of the modern naturalist, Descartes’ thinking sub-
stance and material substance, or even those oc-
casions when Christians divide the world dualisti-
cally into spiritual and physical realms.  The unity 
in creation assures us that nothing that exists does 
so neutrally or autonomously, apart from the Word 
of God calling it into being for service.  That unity 
also leads to the next critical point: the unity that 
human creatures have with the rest of creation.
Th e Creatureliness of Being Human
God created humankind in his image, as ex-
plained in Genesis 1 and Psalm 8.  But this image-
bearing creature is nonetheless a part of creation, 
called into being for service.  As image-bearers of the 
Creator, humans are given responsibility and (un-
like non-human creatures) are thus free to respond 
either obediently or disobediently to the Creator. 
Human actions are therefore no less natural than 
the actions of plants and animals, stars or atoms. 
The difference is that human actions are performed 
in responsibility and, therefore, can be judged to be 
either in service or in disservice to the Creator and 
the rest of creation.  Human actions should no more 
be characterized as “interventions” or “intrusions” 
into creation than should the actions of squirrels. 
The “natural” course of human actions (“natural” 
being deﬁ ned as “in accordance with God’s will”) 
is to assist the rest of creation in ﬂ ourishing, in be-
ing what the Creator calls it to be.  The “unnatu-
ral” course of human actions (“unnatural” being 
deﬁ ned as “in disobedience to God’s will”) brings 
brokenness and distortion to creation.
Being creaturely also means that humans are 
ﬁ nite.  We recognize that ﬁ nitude in many ways. 
Our physical strength is ﬁ nite.  Our vision is ﬁ nite. 
Each day of our lives contains a ﬁ nite amount of 
time, which itself is part of the created order.  In 
this post-fall world, the length of our lives is ﬁ -
nite.  Considering together the radical distinction 
between God, on the one hand, and creation and 
the ﬁ nitude of humanity, on the other, we are able 
to conclude, in a relatively straightforward way, that 
our thinking and reasoning ability is ﬁ nite and crea-
turely as well.  Reason is something that God cre-
ated in order to enable his image-bearing creature 
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to respond to him freely; thus, it is in this matter of 
reason that, from a biblical perspective, we must take 
issue with Galileo. To equate human knowing with 
God’s knowing is to elevate a part of creation to 
the position of God—it is to create an idol.  Reason 
is not God; it is part of creation.  It is ﬁ nite and 
creaturely.  When we talk of “God knowing,” we 
do so analogically.  When God “reasons” with us,28
he does so through his created means, by stooping 
to the level of his creature.  Science, whether math-
ematics, quantum mechanics, molecular biology, or 
theology, is always ﬁ nite and creaturely, character-
ized by our nature as beings created in the image 
of God.
Sadly, there is one more important character-
istic of creatureliness which must be recognized. 
Genesis 3 tells the story of humankind’s fall into sin 
and the consequent curse upon the whole of creation 
that followed that fall.  Thus, creatureliness in our 
post-fall world implies sinfulness and brokenness. 
Surely that is the case for God’s image-bearing crea-
tures.  However, it is also the case—in a different 
way, of course—with the non-human creation.  The 
“thorns and thistles” of Genesis 3:18 and the “bond-
age to decay” of Romans 8:21 may be metaphors, 
but they are metaphors that point unambiguously 
to a creation that suffers under the curse, brought 
about by humanity’s sin.  Sin and the curse afﬂ ict 
the whole of creation much as original sin afﬂ icts all 
humankind: it is systemic, pervasive to the very core 
of creation’s being.29  Thus science and technology 
must work with a creation that is both orderly and 
broken.  On the one hand, there is much that can be 
learned by studying creation.30  On the other hand, 
we must be careful not to assume that those parts 
of creation not directly affected by humans—as it 
were, untouched by human hands—are somehow 
pristine, in an ideal state that requires no healing or 
warrants no development.
Th e Relationship Between the Human
and the Non-human Creation
Given this biblical-theistic starting point, can 
we begin to articulate an answer to the question of 
the relationship between the human and non-hu-
man creation?  I believe we can if we take into con-
sideration one more important biblical doctrine—a 
doctrine sometimes referred to as the “creation 
mandate.”  In Genesis 1:28, we read the following 
regarding the ﬁ rst humans:
  God blessed them and said to them, “Be fruit-
ful and increase in number; ﬁ ll the earth and sub-
due it. Rule over the ﬁ sh of the sea and the birds of 
the air and over every living creature that moves 
on the ground.”  
This command is re-stated in Genesis 2:15 as 
follows:
  The LORD God took the man and put him in 
the Garden of Eden to work it and take care of it. 
This task given to humanity—to develop and 
preserve creation—is directly related to our being 
created in the image of God.  This is stated succinct-
ly in Psalm 8:4-8 (although to understand the word 
“ruler,” we need to consult other parts of Scripture 
such as the Genesis accounts of creation and those 
dealing with God’s covenant with creation):
  What is man that you are mindful of him, the 
son of man that you care for him?  You made him a 
little lower than the heavenly beings and crowned 
him with glory and honor.  You made him ruler 
over the works of your hands; you put everything 
under his feet: all ﬂ ocks and herds, and the beasts 
of the ﬁ eld, the birds of the air, and the ﬁ sh of the 
sea, all that swim the paths of the seas.31
Humankind, thus, has a unique place in creation. 
However, it is too easy to misinterpret that unique-
ness to mean “wholly otherness.”  One such misin-
terpretation is to devalue the non-human creation 
to the extent that it exists only for the purposes of 
Sin and the curse afflict 
the whole of creation much 
as original sin afflicts all 
humankind: it is systemic, 
pervasive to the very core of 
creation’s being.
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humankind.  Stress is then placed on development 
to the exclusion of preservation, and humankind 
supposes itself free to use (or abuse) the non-human 
creation in whatever manner it fancies.  Sadly, this 
has been the tendency of the Church, under the in-
ﬂ uence of a dualistic mentality that values only “the 
spiritual” and devalues “the material” as worth-
less.  The other misinterpretation of humankind’s 
uniqueness as “wholly other” is to view humanity 
as creation’s intruder, who is capable of doing very 
little except pillaging creation. In this view, all non-
human phenomena are considered “natural” while 
human actions affecting creation are considered 
“artiﬁ cial” (the implication being that artiﬁ cial is 
“unnatural”).  The Scriptures, however, counte-
nance no such misinterpretations.  In the biblical 
narrative and the biblical worldview, humanity is an 
integral part of creation.  There exists a necessary re-
lationship between the human and the non-human 
creation, such that neither can be what it is called by 
God to be without the other.  Obviously human-
kind is dependent on the non-human creation for 
its very existence.  However, the non-human cre-
ation depends on humanity as well.  It cannot fully 
ﬂ ourish without the cultivation to which humanity 
is called by God.  This mutual dependence is made 
wonderfully clear in a passage from the book of 
Ezekiel, where the Lord commands the prophet to 
speak to the mountains and hills:
  Therefore prophesy concerning the land of 
Israel and say to the mountains and hills, to the 
ravines and valleys: “This is what the Sovereign 
LORD says: I speak in my jealous wrath be-
cause you have suffered the scorn of the nations.  
Therefore this is what the Sovereign LORD says: 
I swear with uplifted hand that the nations around 
you will also suffer scorn.  
  But you, O mountains of Israel, will produce 
branches and fruit for my people Israel, for they 
will soon come home.  I am concerned for you and 
will look on you with favor; you will be plowed 
and sown, and I will multiply the number of peo-
ple upon you, even the whole house of Israel. The 
towns will be inhabited and the ruins rebuilt.  I 
will increase the number of men and animals upon 
you, and they will be fruitful and become numer-
ous. I will settle people on you as in the past and 
will make you prosper more than before. Then 
you will know that I am the LORD.  I will cause 
people, my people Israel, to walk upon you. They 
will possess you, and you will be their inheritance; 
you will never again deprive them of their chil-
dren.” 32
The message here is straightforward: the moun-
tains and hills prosper when they serve as the in-
heritance of God’s people. Likewise, God’s people 
can be fruitful only in mutual dependence with 
those mountains and hills.  Thus the relationship 
between the human and non-human creation is one 
of interdependence.  While the non-human creation 
provides God’s image-bearers with food, clothing, 
shelter, and the very materials out of which their 
bodies are made, God’s image-bearers serve the 
non-human creation by enabling it to ﬂ ourish.
EPISTEMOLOGICAL HUMILITY
You asked, “Who is this that obscures my counsel 
without knowledge?”  Surely I spoke of things I 
did not understand, things too wonderful for me 
to know. (Job 42:3, NIV )
Job learned epistemological humility the hard 
way.  From the ash heap of his wrecked life, he came 
to understand what the prophet Isaiah knew when 
he wrote,
“My thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are 
your ways may ways,” declares the LORD.  “As 
the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my 
ways higher than your ways and my thoughts than 
your thoughts.”  (Isaiah 55:8-9, NIV )
By “epistemological humility,” I want to suggest 
a posture of appropriate servanthood and creature-
liness with respect to our relationship with God 
and the non-human creation, particularly in terms 
of how we know the latter. To know—in the full-
est sense of that word—is a peculiarly human and, 
hence, a distinctly creaturely activity.  As mentioned 
earlier, to speak of God “knowing” is to speak ana-
logically and legitimately as image-bearing creatures 
of God.  Human knowing, even rational knowing, 
is never absolute.  Thus certainty never has the ab-
solute character that Galileo ascribed to mathemat-
ics or that Descartes ascribed to deduction.  
Knowledge is multi-dimensional.  For example, 
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come to call the laws of physics?  Might it not be be-
cause we have absolutized both our understanding 
of physical law and human understanding itself?  
From an attitude of epistemological humility 
we will certainly reject the hubris of technicism. 
Ray Kurzweil’s notions of immortality based on 
increasing technological development are rooted 
in the contradictory notions that, on the one hand, 
human understanding is unlimited and that, on 
the other hand, humans are nothing more than 
evolving centers of matter, energy, and informa-
tion.  Epistemological humility will not curtail our 
imagining of future technological developments, 
but it will certainly persuade us of the foolishness 
of technological triumphalism.  Science ﬁ ction can 
play a healthy role in the technological imagination, 
as long as it remains science “ﬁ ction.”
We will also reject bio-romanticism: the notion 
that what we understand as the non-human creation 
is somehow perfect and that it is we humans who 
are the sole cause of all brokenness in the world. 
Interestingly this notion rests upon the naturalistic 
assumptions that all causality is physical causality 
and that human knowledge of the non-human cre-
ation is valid in an absolute sense.  It also rests upon 
the assumption that there is something about human 
beings that makes them “un-natural.”  If one probes 
those assumptions a bit, one comes to the conclu-
sion that for William Wordsworth 33 or for ardent 
if a teacher drops a chunk of iron sulﬁ de into a small 
beaker of hydrochloric acid in the midst of class of 
high school sophomores, they will break out in gig-
gles because they “know” that distinctively biotic 
odor.  They haven’t had chemistry yet, so they don’t 
“know” hydrogen sulﬁ de in the same way that the 
upperclassmen who have been through chemistry 
lab know hydrogen sulﬁ de.  Rather, they know it 
“sensitively.”  Although there are surely elements of 
reason involved in their knowledge, those sopho-
mores know hydrogen sulﬁ de gas primarily by 
means of their sense of smell.  
There are other modes of knowing beside the 
rational and the sensitive.  Perhaps the one we tend 
to overlook most easily is faith knowledge.  When 
we recite the Apostle’s Creed, we begin by saying, “I 
believe.”  The knowledge content of the Apostle’s 
Creed certainly has a rational side, but it is, ﬁ rst and 
foremost, faith knowledge.  What we too often fail 
to see is that faith knowledge is also fundamental to 
our work in science.  In order for us to proceed in 
science, we must trust that the scientiﬁ c method is 
valid, that there is indeed a dependable lawfulness 
behind the regularities we observe in nature, and 
that the relationship between our thinking abilities 
and those regularities outside ourselves provide us 
faithfully, even if only provisionally, with insight 
into the behavior we observe.
This is perhaps a good place to summarize a 
major thesis of this paper.  Given that we are crea-
tures and not the Creator, and on the evidence pro-
vided by the history of science—particularly when 
we see the historic roles played by the Aristotelian, 
Newtonian, modern worldviews in the develop-
ment of scientiﬁ c thought—we must conclude that 
scientiﬁ c knowledge will always be ﬁ nite and tenta-
tive, never absolute.  Thus, an attitude of epistemo-
logical humility ought to characterize our work in 
science and technology.
From an attitude of epistemological humility, 
we will want to question the basic assumptions of 
naturalism.  Why should causality be exclusively 
physical causality?  Certainly this is the way we have 
experienced nature during the last four hundred or 
so years.  However, it is not an attitude common to 
humanity across the world and throughout recorded 
history.  Furthermore, why should the explanation 
of all our experience be reducible to what we have 
While the non-human 
creation provides God’s 
image-bearers with food, 
clothing, shelter, and the 
very materials out of which 
their bodies are made, 
God’s image-bearers serve 
the non-human creation by 
enabling it to flourish.
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followers of PETA, 34 bio-romantic inclinations are 
rooted in a commitment to the autonomy of human 
thought, not unlike that expressed by Galileo and 
Descartes.  Thus epistemological humility calls into 
question the naturalism of physical reductionists as 
well as the naturalism of bio-romanticists.
Epistemological humility, however, will embrace 
the notion of servanthood.  By rejecting the kind 
of absolute certainty that Galileo and Descartes 
claimed for human knowledge, we come to recog-
nize our own creatureliness and our dependence on 
the One who created us.  We are thereby enabled to 
take up our role as servants of our Creator, of each 
other, and of the non-human creation.
EGBERT SCHUURMAN’S PHILOSOPHY 
OF TECHNOLOGY
Returning to the questions of the relationship 
of the human to the non-human creation and the 
apparent tension between development and conser-
vation, we ﬁ nd that an examination of the philoso-
phy of technology developed by Egbert Schuurman 
can be most helpful.  In particular, Schuurman 
uses the concept of “meaning disclosure” to get 
at the essence of obedient technological develop-
ment and to distinguish it from technicism, un-
derstood as technological development for its own 
sake.  Schuurman’s recent book, Faith and Hope in 
Technolog y, published in 2003, is most helpful be-
cause it addresses in particular the concerns raised 
by biotechnology.  A more complete discussion of 
the concept of “meaning disclosure,” however, is 
found in his earlier work, Technolog y and the Future
published in 1980. 35
Schuurman argues that creation is more than 
just the physical and the biotic.  Human functioning 
gives clear evidence of dimensions beyond the phys-
ical and biotic, dimensions such as the historical, so-
cial, lingual, as well as the dimension of faith, just 
to name a few.  However,  Schuurman argues also 
for the participation of the non-human creation in 
these post-biotic dimensions. 36 For example, just as 
humans cannot be fully human (cannot even exist!) 
without the physical and biotic sides to their integral 
selves, the non-human creation requires the ser-
vice of human beings for the full expression of its 
multifaceted wholeness.  This service occurs when 
humans interact with the non-human creation, en-
abling the non-human creation to ﬂ ourish in ways 
otherwise impossible.
Recall the prophecy of Ezekiel 36.  The land 
ﬂ ourishes when God brings his people back to it, 
when the ruins are rebuilt, and people and animals 
are once more thriving “in the land.”  The unity and 
interdependency evidenced in that prophetic vision 
are what guide Schuurman’s view of technology. 
When humans engage in technology obediently, ac-
cording to God’s normative Word, then creation is 
opened up, its post-biotic dimensions are disclosed, 
and it gloriﬁ es its Creator in new ways.  Of course, 
when humans engage in technology disobediently, 
in opposition to God’s normative Word, then the 
non-human creation is distorted, and its capacity for 
glorifying its Creator is diminished.
A second key element in Schuurman’s philoso-
phy of technology is his careful distinction between 
science and technology.  Both involve meaning dis-
closure.  However, science is seeking to understand 
creation by analysis, that is, by means of logical ab-
straction.  In physics, for example, we separate the 
irreducibly physical characteristics of a given phe-
nomenon from its other characteristics in order to 
better understand that abstracted physical aspect. 
Technology, on the other hand, discloses meaning 
in a different way.  Instead of seeking to understand 
what is already there, technology seeks to bring into 
being what exists only in potential. The method of 
technology is likewise different from the method 
of science.  Rather than dealing with abstractions 
from our experience of reality, technology deals 
with reality in its wholeness.  A signiﬁ cant part of 
Schuurman’s critique of technicism is that it focuses 
on technological problems as if they were scientiﬁ c 
problems, examining only aspects of a situation, de-
tached from the context of the whole.  
A third key element in Schuurman’s philosophy 
of technology is his careful distinction between 
physical and biotic meaning and his warning, with 
regard to biotechnology, that we heed this distinc-
tion.37  Modern technology, up until the present 
time, has dealt overwhelmingly with physical phe-
nomena.  Only recently has biotechnology signiﬁ -
cantly altered that emphasis.  However, physical 
technology must concern itself with the laws for 
physical subjects.  One of the most important of 
those laws is what we have come to call the Second 
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Law of Thermo-dynamics.  It states that for closed 
systems and in all physical processes, the tendency 
is always to move in the direction of uniformity and 
randomness.  In physical processes involving en-
ergy transformation, for example, the Second Law 
states that some energy will always be dissipated as 
low-level thermal energy, the random motion of the 
mass particles of a system.  This characteristic of 
physical things is a primary factor in all physical 
technology.  Any and all design that seeks to trans-
form the physical must cope with the Second Law 
of Thermodynamics.
Biotic meaning, however, is different.  Despite 
having a physical dimension and therefore also be-
ing subject to the Second Law, living things are sub-
ject to biotic laws that transcend and are irreduc-
ible to physical law.  In part, this biotic lawfulness 
may be stated as “autonomous procreation and the 
preservation of the whole despite the continuous 
change of its parts.”38 Let us use the term “biotic 
ﬂ ourishing” to connote these characteristics as well 
as some others that help us distinguish living things 
from physical things.  Biotic ﬂ ourishing leads liv-
ing things in the direction of higher complexity and 
increased differentiation.  The Lord makes use of 
this characteristic of living things in his mustard 
seed metaphor: “Though it is the smallest of all your 
seeds, yet when it grows, it is the largest of garden 
plants and becomes a tree, so that the birds of the 
air come and perch in its branches.” 39 Of course, the 
language of the creation mandate contains, in part, 
the same language used to direct all living things: 
“Be fruitful and increase in number.” 40  
The key point here is not only that the Second 
Law of Thermodynamics and biotic ﬂ ourishing 
distinguish, respectively, physical things and living 
things but also that these two general laws direct their 
respective creatures oppositely.  All physical things are 
subject to the Second Law of Thermodynamics.  All 
living things—which are also physical—are sub-
ject to the law for biotic ﬂ ourishing as well as the 
Second Law of Thermodynamics.  Schuurman puts 
it this way:
The difference between the technology of the 
inorganic and the technology of the organic be-
comes clear when we note the different laws which 
apply to the two domains.  In inorganic nature ev-
erything tends in the direction of leveling.  …In 
the world of living things, however, we witness a 
process of increasing differentiation.41
If in our minds we reduce living things to physical 
things, if we believe that biological activity is merely 
an expression of physical law, we will approach bio-
technology with the same tools, procedures, and at-
titudes with which we approach physical technology. 
Doing so may have dire consequences.
Consider that since the Industrial Revolution—
the period of history that has given expression to 
“modern technology”—technological initiatives 
have had chieﬂ y to contend with physical law such 
as the Second Law of Thermodynamics.  Thus, the 
tools, procedures, and attitudes of modern technol-
ogy are those associated with physical technology, 
developed in the course of dealing with the tenden-
cy of things to move in the direction of random-
When humans engage 
in technology obediently, 
according to God’s 
normative Word, then 
creation is opened up, its 
post-biotic dimensions are 
disclosed, and it glorifies 
its Creator in new ways.  
Of course, when humans 
engage in technology 
disobediently, in opposition 
to God’s normative Word, 
then the non-human 
creation is distorted, and 
its capacity for glorifying its 
Creator is diminished.
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ness, uniformity, and leveling—the tendencies of 
processes to slow down and stop.  On only relatively 
rare occasions has modern technology had to deal 
with ﬂ ourishing as a problem.  Those problems have 
largely had to do with the transplantation of species 
of living things from their native habitat to one that 
enabled reproduction to occur in an uncontrolled 
and proﬂ igate manner (e.g., rabbits in Australia; 
gypsy moths, Africanized bees, and carp in the 
United States 42).  In physical technology, problems 
of proﬂ igacy are never truly physical but always so-
cial in nature, 43 for example, the proliferation of 
automobiles and the resulting social and environ-
mental degradation.
The posture of modern technology has thus 
been established by the technology of the physical. 
If we take a reductionistic approach to living things, 
seeing them as nothing but complicated expressions 
of physical law, we will have no inclination to alter 
that posture as we engage in biotechnology.  The 
result will be our unpreparedness to deal with prob-
lems such as biotic proﬂ igacy, problems associated 
with the response of living things to distinctively 
biotic laws.
Edward Tenner, in his book Why Things Bite Back: 
Technolog y and the Revenge of Unintended Consequences, de-
scribes the kind of technological problems that can 
occur when the whole is mistaken for the sum of 
its parts, as when a living thing is mistaken for a 
series of complex chemical reactions.  He calls these 
technological problems “revenge effects,” in order 
to distinguish them from “side effects” and trade-
offs—two kinds of technological problems that are 
more clearly understood.44 Revenge effects are not 
conﬁ ned to biotechnology.  Revenge effects in in-
formation technology are legion.  One has only to 
consider how the “blessing” of e-mail has induced 
the “curse” of spam.  However, revenge effects in 
biotechnology are both precipitated and aggravated 
by those characteristics of living things that are not 
reducible to physical systems, e.g., ﬂ ourishing.
STEWARDSHIP: BOTH BIOTECHNOLOGY 
AND CREATION CARE
A Story of Buﬀ alos and Chimney Pots
Early on a snowy Sunday morning some time 
ago, I sat in the enclosed porch on the back of my 
house and watched the sky slowly brighten.  The 
softly falling snow obscured the sunrise, but the 
view to the east and south was nonetheless beauti-
ful.  I had enclosed the porch the previous summer; 
and with ﬂ oor-to-ceiling windows enveloping more 
than half the room, a gas-ﬁ red stove for heat, car-
pet on the ﬂ oor, and a comfortable reading chair in 
which to sit, the new room provides a way of ex-
periencing the outdoors while maintaining indoor 
comfort.  Since I live on a ridge on the Iowa prairie, 
on a clear day I am able to see many miles toward 
the distance horizon, despite the presence of the 
surrounding houses that constitute the suburban 
development of which my house is one part.  For 
example, the water tower in the next town, twelve 
miles to the southeast, is often striking in its round, 
orange visibility.
On this particular morning, however, the ob-
scuring quality of the lightly falling snow focused 
my attention on what once was the surrounding 
prairie.  I tried imagining what the scene was like a 
hundred years ago, with the rolling hills dominated 
by prairie grass—and perhaps a herd of buffalo 
nearby.  It was then that I was tempted to wish away 
the other houses, streets, lampposts, and other signs 
of civilization so that I could glimpse the natural, 
unadulterated prairie.  Notice I said “tempted.”  I 
couldn’t really bring myself to wish away those ar-
tifacts of civilization because I believe that houses, 
streets, and lampposts are just as “natural” as the 
prairie grass.  They are simply a different kind of na-
ture—cultural nature, if you will.  As an engineer, I 
am someone who believes ﬁ rmly that the Lord has 
called us to unfold and develop the creation, bring-
ing forth creatures (like houses, streets, and lamp-
posts) that exist only in potential until humankind’s 
response to the creation mandate brings them into 
being.
Still, on this particular morning I was torn.  I 
had developed a sense of empathy for my Dordt col-
leagues in the life sciences for whom, it sometimes 
seems, the only truly beautiful landscape is one that 
shows no inﬂ uence of technology.  I yearned to see 
the pristine prairie grass bending slightly under the 
weight of lightly falling snow, the playful scurrying 
of prairie dogs, and the slow-moving buffalo as the 
snow creates a cloak of white on their woolly and 
dark- brown backs.
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Then, however, I realized that I had seen all 
these things before.  In fact, the imaginative longing 
that stirred within me that snowy Sunday morning 
could never have occurred had I not already been 
acquainted with those denizens of God’s good cre-
ation.  I remembered the ﬁ lm The Vanishing Prairie, 
which was produced by Walt Disney back when I 
was a child in the 1950s. I also remembered more 
recent real life experiences of these prairie creatures 
in Blue Mounds, Minnesota, and in Custer National 
Park in South Dakota.  It was these memories, co-
existing with the scene before me, that helped create 
that yearning for a more pristine scene, a yearning 
that seemed somehow out of synch with my appre-
ciation for technology.
After a few more moments of musing, however, 
it occurred to me that I have other memories with 
the power to create other imaginative longings for 
very different vistas.  In particular, I recalled travel-
ing with my wife two years ago to England.  One 
of the cities that we visited was York, a place whose 
medieval personality is preserved in the layout of the 
streets, the character if the buildings, and especially 
the ancient wall that surrounds the city.  Many of 
the older cities in England were walled cities, built 
in early medieval times with the need for protection 
from less-civilized neighbors.  The wall in York is 
the best preserved of all these cities, and an ambi-
tious visitor can walk atop the wall, almost com-
pletely around the city, in just a few hours.  One van-
tage point on the wall offers an exquisitely beautiful 
view of the York Minster Cathedral of St. Peter, one 
of England’s largest and oldest churches, completed 
in the year 1470, after two hundred and ﬁ fty years of 
construction.  The sight I remember best, however, 
occurred when we stood atop the wall and looked 
outward from the city center toward the surrounding 
suburbs.  Of course, this being England, the “sub-
urbs” of York were developed during the nineteenth 
century and so represent the Victorian era, the time 
in which Charles Dickens lived and about which he 
wrote in his many novels and stories.  What struck 
me most about that view were the ubiquitous earth-
enware chimney pots that punctuated the horizon, 
telling of a time when the hundreds of aged houses 
were heated by ﬁ replaces that burned wood or coal. 
Thinking about that view from the wall in York, 
and contrasting it with the view from my enclosed 
porch, I realized that the vision of Victorian society 
suggested by the one, and the vision of prairie grass 
and buffalo suggested by the other, are both beauti-
ful, God-glorifying, and very much natural in their 
own way.  The tension between biotic nature, on 
the one hand, and cultural nature, on the other, is 
a false tension and was here resolved for me by my 
recalling the aesthetic experiences of viewing the 
once-upon-a-time, prairie-grass-dominated horizon 
from my enclosed porch, and the Victorian suburbs 
of Northern England from the wall in York.   Truly, 
as the writer of Ecclesiastes has told us, God “has 
made everything beautiful in its time.”45
Conclusion
The tension between biotechnology and cre-
ation care, between development and conservation, 
is a false one.  We are called by our Creator to be 
stewards of his good creation, caring for it both by 
bringing healing and helping it ﬂ ourish.  By adopt-
ing a posture of epistemological humility, we will be 
prone neither to abuse the non-human creation nor 
to set it on a pedestal out of reach.  Rather, we will 
see ourselves as one part of creation—the part that 
has responsibility for the wellbeing of the whole.  We 
will see our knowledge as ﬁ nite and affected by sin, 
and we will see our artifacts—including biotechno-
logical artifacts—as the products of that ﬁ nite and 
fallible knowledge.  When produced with care, they 
will have as much natural place as the ﬂ owers of 
the ﬁ elds and the birds of the air.  For they will be 
evidence of the unity in nature: “cultural nature” 
arising from “biotic nature.”
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